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In this study, I test whether firms reduce the information asymmetry stemming from the 
political process by investing in political connections. I expect that connected firms enjoy 
differential access to relevant political information, and use this information to mitigate 
the negative consequences of political uncertainty. I investigate this construct in the 
context of firm-specific investment, where prior literature has documented a negative 
relation between investment and uncertainty. Specifically, I regress firm investment 
levels on the interaction of time-varying political uncertainty and the degree of a firm’s 
political connectedness, controlling for determinants of investment, political 
participation, general macroeconomic conditions, and firm and time-period fixed effects. 
Consistent with prior work, I first document that firm-specific investment levels are 
significantly lower during periods of increased uncertainty, defined as the year leading up 
to a national election. I then assess the extent that political connections offset the negative 
effect of political uncertainty. Consistent with my hypothesis, I document the mitigating 
effect of political connections on the negative relation between investment levels and 
political uncertainty. These findings are robust to controls for alternative explanations 
related to the pre-electoral manipulation hypothesis and industry-level political 
participation. These findings are also robust to alternative specifications designed to 
address the possibility that time-invariant firm characteristics are driving the observed 
results. I also examine whether investors consider time-varying political uncertainty and 





I find support that the earnings-response coefficient is lower during periods of increased 
uncertainty. However, I do not find evidence that investors incorporate the value relevant 
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Governments are constantly faced with policy decisions – whether to change policy, 
and if so, which policies to adopt. The extent to which political influences (such as 
partisan differences, the demands of competing constituency, and (re)election concerns) 
alter policy outcomes represents a significant source of uncertainty for firms and market 
participants (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987; 1988; Garfinkel and Glazer, 1994; Pástor 
and Veronesi, 2012). Consistent with political uncertainty being a significant factor, 
several studies consider the extent to which investors and financial analysts factor in 
uncertainty in the prevailing political climate when revising expectations for firms’ cash 
flows (Pástor and Veronesi, 2012; Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov, 2012; 
Belo, Gala, and Li, 2012; Brown, Lin, Moore, and Wellman, 2014; Christensen, 
Mikhail, Walther, and Wellman, 2014; Baloria and Mamo, 2014). More recently, 
researchers have focused on the implications for firm-level decisions, documenting 
depressed investment levels during periods of high political uncertainty (Julio and 
Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2013). These studies demonstrate the negative impact of 
uncertainty, but do little to explore strategies that managers can adopt at the micro-level 
in an effort to reduce uncertainty at the macro-level. This study tests whether politically 
connected firms reduce the information asymmetry stemming from the political process, 
mitigating the negative consequences of political uncertainty. 
Articles in the business press highlight the growing importance of managing 
investment risk with “economic challenges” and “ongoing questions about government 
fiscal direction” creating significant uncertainty for firms (CFO Journal, 2014, March 
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5). More recently, debates over “lucrative” tax extenders, such as the bonus depreciation 
deduction, point to uncertainty preventing real decisions such as investment and hiring 
(CFO Journal, 2014, July 9). Not surprisingly, partisan politics further contribute to 
uncertainty. In the case of tax extenders, the influences of competing constituency and 
partisan politics are clear. While Republicans may be willing to consider tax extenders 
in exchange for repealing an “unpopular tax” put in place under healthcare reform, 
Democrats may “roll the dice,” pushing tax extenders that may benefit domestic firms, 
while also pushing to eliminate loopholes that largely benefit multinationals 
(McKinnon, 2014). Republicans and Democrats do have one thing in common – both 
groups are sensitive to (re)election concerns, and both can agree to postpone a final vote 
until after election time, further contributing to political uncertainty. Collectively, these 
anecdotes point to the various factors that compromise policy formation, contributing to 
uncertainty over firms’ investment decisions. 
While the legislative process can produce an abundance of information and possible 
alternatives, increased understanding over the factors that influence individual 
policymakers (i.e. re-election concerns, demands of constituency, and ideological 
views) allows connected firms to better assess the likelihood of legislative outcomes. 
This study examines whether firms that establish political connections via meaningful 
campaign support enjoy superior access to relevant information  
(e.g., Austen-Smith,1995; Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001). In turn, these firms should 
experience less investment-related information risk, offsetting (in part) the effect of 
policy uncertainty on investment levels.  
To test this hypothesis, I regress firm-specific investment levels on the interaction 
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of time-varying policy uncertainty and the degree of a firm’s political connectedness, 
controlling for determinants of investment, political participation, general 
macroeconomic conditions, and firm and time-period fixed effects. I consider several 
measures of time-varying policy uncertainty.1 Consistent with prior literature, I use the 
timing of national elections as a proxy for political uncertainty (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; 
Alesina, 1987, 1988; Garfinkel and Glazer, 1994; Julio and Yook, 2012). In addition, 
relying on the Economic Policy Uncertainty index constructed by Baker, Bloom, and 
Davis (2013), I employ two additional measures of policy uncertainty meant to capture 
general and tax-specific sources of uncertainty. Drawing on theory advanced by Hillman 
and Hitt (1999), and empirical measures developed by Cooper, Gulen, and 
Ovtchinnikov (2010), I consider four measures of a firm’s political connectedness. 
These measures capture the dichotomous nature of political connections, the breadth of 
candidates supported, and relevant candidate attributes (i.e., whether the candidate 
shares domicile with the firm, and whether the candidate serves on tax-writing 
committees).  
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find a mitigating effect of political connections 
on the negative relation between investment levels and policy uncertainty. This finding 
is robust to including previously identified determinants of investment and political 
participation, controls meant to capture general macroeconomic conditions, as well as 
firm and time period fixed effects. Among the various proxies for the firm’s overall 
political connectedness that I study, I find the strongest evidence for connections 
                                                          
1 See Section 3 for additional detail on the construction of political uncertainty and political connectedness 
proxies.  
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established with “home state” candidates, or those candidates that share domicile with 
the affiliated firm, and connections established with tax-writing members of Congress.  
My use of this measure is consistent with a line of research in political science 
that argues greater differential access will be granted to contributing firms that share a 
common district with an affiliated candidate (Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001). This is 
largely driven by the ability of large employers to mobilize their employees, which often 
represent a substantial constituency for the affiliated candidate. Furthermore, Eggers and 
Hainmueller (2013) contend that connections with home state candidates result in even 
less information asymmetry between the firm and the affiliated candidate because of 
geographic proximity, common policy objectives, and ideological views. Not 
surprisingly, the evidence in Cooper et al. (2010) suggests that political ties with home 
stat candidates most strongly capture the value associated with political connections, 
relative to other measures considered in their study.  
While my primary findings are consistent with my hypothesis, I recognize and 
test two possible alternative explanations. First, the pre-electoral manipulation 
hypothesis, beginning with Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977), suggests that connected 
firms may undergo efforts to artificially improve economic conditions, influencing voter 
sentiment in an effort to ensure re-election for their affiliated candidates. If connected 
firms are temporarily inflating investment in the period leading up to an election, I 
expect to find reversals in the post-election period. Consistent with my primary 
hypothesis, and inconsistent with the pre-electoral manipulation hypothesis, I do not 
find any evidence that connected firms reverse investment in the post-election period. 
Second, another possible concern is that I am not adequately controlling for collective 
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action. In other words, the moderating effect of firm-specific political connectedness on 
macro-level policy uncertainty may be a result of collective action at the industry-level. 
However, my primary findings, although slightly weaker, are robust to including an 
additional control for industry-level campaign financing in my primary investment 
regression.  
Finally, I perform additional sensitivity designed to address the possibility that  
time-invariant firm characteristics are driving the observed results. As an alternative to 
including firm fixed effects in my regression model, I control for time-invariant 
characteristics by estimating a difference-in-difference design. To do this, I interact my 
election cycle indicator variable with all time-varying firm and macroeconomic 
characteristics. I find that political connections continue to mitigate the negative effect 
of policy uncertainty on investment levels. Taken together, this evidence is consistent 
with firms obtaining relevant information through their political connections, rather than 
a time-invariant firm characteristic driving the results.  
After addressing alternative explanations for my primary results, I test the 
valuation implications of policy uncertainty for firm-specific investment. Increased 
levels of policy uncertainty result in depressed levels of investment that are not fully 
recovered in the next period (Julio and Yook, 2012). Such a finding implies lower 
growth in investment through time, lower growth in abnormal earnings, and thus lower 
earnings persistence (Stigler, 1963; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Fama and French, 2000; 
Kothari, 2001). It is not clear, ex-ante, when the negative consequences of uncertainty 
would manifest in future earnings. Thus, I study the impact of increased policy 
uncertainty on investors’ expectations of all future periods’ earnings. Specifically, I 
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estimate the market reaction to unexpected earnings, conditional on the level of policy 
uncertainty. Lower persistence in the time-series property of earnings implies lower 
earnings response coefficients (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Easton and Zmijewski, 
1989). Thus, I expect that investors will discount unexpected earnings during periods of 
increased uncertainty. Consistent with this expectation, I document that the  
earnings-response coefficient (ERC) is lower during periods of increased uncertainty.  
I then test whether investors understand the potential value of political 
connections. I do not find any consistent evidence that the reduction in ERCs during 
periods of increased uncertainty varies with the political connectedness of the firm. 
Investors’ inability to recognize the value of connections is consistent with the findings 
of Cooper et al. (2010) who document future abnormal returns stemming from the 
firm’s overall political relationships. The implication of their study is that investors do 
not immediately impound the information in political connections for firm value. 
I contribute to the literature on the real effects of policy uncertainty by 
documenting an important strategy that managers can rely on in order to mitigate 
investment-related information risk, investing in political relationships. I also contribute 
to the literature on the outcomes of political connections. The extant literature argues 
that political connections can be important for firm value (Cooper et al., 2010; Faccio, 
2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2010; 
Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni, 2012; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011). More recently, 
researchers are starting to explore the mechanisms underlying value creation, 
documenting, for example, the tax benefits that arise from investments in relationships 
with candidates over time (Brown, Drake, and Wellman, 2014; Kim and Zhang, 2014). 
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Collectively, these studies establish a link between political participation and firm value, 
emphasizing the ability of connected firms to influence legislative outcomes. In 
contrast, I investigate the role of information in the political marketplace.2 The findings 
of my study support theories from the literature on corporate political activity that 
managers can develop strategies that not only garner favorable legislative outcomes, but 
also directly impact internal decision making by gaining access to relevant information 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999). 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I develop my hypothesis. In Section 
3, I discuss the empirical measures for my two key constructs, time-varying policy 
uncertainty, and a firm’s political connectedness. Section 4 presents evidence on the 
mitigating effect of investments in differential access to policy news on investment-
related policy risk, and to what extent investors value these investments. Section 5 













                                                          
2 Legal scholars define political information as material, non-public information, acquired by policymakers 
throughout the course of their professional activities. Currently policymakers, protected under “legislative 
conduct,” are permitted to disclose this information to their constituents in an effort to form more optimal 
policy decisions (Kim 2012).  






In this section I develop my hypothesis that superior access to political 
information mitigates the negative effect of political uncertainty on investment levels. I 
argue that differential access to legislators, and thus access to relevant information about 
which policies will be adopted and their potential impact, should reduce investment-
related information risk from the firm’s perspective. Consequently, politically connected 
firms should not experience the same level of uncertainty surrounding pending or 
prospective legislation and/or regulation. 
Governments have the potential to influence the various parameters that affect 
investment. Ambiguity over which policies will be adopted leads to a significant source 
of uncertainty from the firm’s perspective (Julio and Yook, 2012). For example, 
governments frequently modify tax laws with the intent of stimulating the level of 
investment (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967). Furthermore, government influence may 
potentially affect the cost structure of firms through federal contracts, entry and exit 
barriers, antitrust legislation, and through various types of regulation pertaining to 
employment and healthcare (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Boutchkova et al., 2012). Each of 
these potential levers makes investment in any given period more or less costly. 
Uncertainties over which policies will eventually be adopted arise because of 
various factors that comprise each individual policymaker’s objective function (Pástor 
and Veronesi, 2012). For example, considering the preferences of individual 
policymakers would suggest that partisan politics over various economic variables such 
as inflation, labor, taxes, and government spending may introduce additional uncertainty 
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over policy outcomes (Alesina, 1987, 1988). Furthermore, in a competitive marketplace, 
policymakers likely face conflicting pressures from various constituencies  
(Keim, 2001). To the extent there is heterogeneity in the preferences of the various 
constituencies within and across party lines, and thus heterogeneity in the menu of 
policy choices, the sensitivity of the policymaker’s preferences to these (competing) 
demands introduces uncertainty into the political process (Hibbs, 1977;  
Alesina, 1987, 1988).  
Given the potential influence of the political process on various investment 
parameters, and the uncertainty surrounding potential changes to policy, it is important 
to understand how managers respond to this source of uncertainty when making their 
investment decisions. A separate stream of research in economics and finance 
investigates investment under uncertainty, and in particular the option value associated 
with avoiding irreversible decisions (Bernanke, 1983; McDonald and Siegel, 1986). In 
theory, when individual projects are irreversible, firms will trade off returns from early 
commitment to investment against the benefits of increased information gained by 
waiting to invest. The option value associated with irreversible decisions is further 
highlighted by McDonald and Siegel (1986), who demonstrate that relatively moderate 
amounts of uncertainty can require a significantly higher rate of return on a given 
investment. Related to political uncertainty specifically, Rodrik (1991) shows that 
uncertainty with respect to the duration of reform can impose a hefty tax on investment. 
Interestingly, the response to uncertainty is more nuanced than simply shifting 
investments across time (Julio and Yook, 2012). That is, the option to postpone  
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investment in the current period does not guarantee that the same investment 
opportunity will be available in the next period (Bernanke, 1983).  
The theoretical link between uncertainty and investment is driven by what 
Bernanke (1983) terms the “bad news” principle. Specifically, if the resulting policy 
potentially represents a bad outcome from the firm’s perspective, the option value of 
waiting to invest increases and the firm will rationally postpone (forgo) investment until 
uncertainty is resolved. Consequently, the “bad news” principle suggests that an 
increase in political uncertainty causes reductions in current investment only if there is 
some probability of a bad outcome with respect to macroeconomic, taxation, or 
monetary policies, or with respect to the regulatory environment in general.  
Relying on these theoretical predictions, recent empirical studies in economics 
and finance highlight the sensitivity of investment levels to uncertainty about future 
macroeconomic growth, monetary policy, and government regulation. At the firm-level, 
Julio and Yook (2012) demonstrate that in the face of uncertainty, firms will exercise 
caution and delay investing decisions. Specifically, the authors document that a 
temporary increase in political uncertainty around national elections is negatively 
associated with firm-specific investment levels. An important implication of their study 
is that political uncertainty alters the way in which managers pursue investment 
opportunities. Other studies document investment decisions are less sensitive to changes 
in stock price during election years, and that the impact of political uncertainty on 
investment depends on the difficulties surrounding the legislative process (Hassett and 
Metcalf, 1999). Taken together, these studies suggest that the political process 
represents a significant source of uncertainty from the firm’s perspective, influencing 
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the various decisions that managers face (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004). These 
findings also suggest that managers have an incentive to reduce political uncertainty as 
it pertains to firm-level investment decisions. 
To the extent firms are able to actively communicate with policymakers at various 
points of any given debate, managers have the opportunity to reduce uncertainty 
associated with pending or prospective legislation (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). I argue that 
there is less information asymmetry between policymakers and politically connected 
firms, allowing connected firms to better assess the likelihood of changes in prospective 
legislation and regulation. The policy arena is a competitive market place where both 
time and information are valuable (Keim, 2001; Austen-Smith, 1995). As a permitted 
part of the legislative process, firms have an opportunity to educate policymakers on the 
(potential) impact of (proposed) legislation (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Through open 
communication, policymakers and their constituents exchange information on pending 
or prospective legislation leading to a reduction in information asymmetry for 
participating firms (Kim, 2013). However, it is unlikely that all firms will have an equal 
opportunity for communication, and differential “access” is granted to firms who 
establish political connections through meaningful campaign support over time 
(Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001; Austen-Smith, 1995; Humphries, 1991).34  
                                                          
3 Economists have also studied the real effects of policy uncertainty at the aggregate level. For example, 
Baker et al. (2012) examine the association between policy uncertainty and various macroeconomic 
variables. For this analysis, the authors develop a novel measure of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) by 
combining the frequency of newspaper references to economic policy uncertainty, the number of federal 
tax code provisions set to expire, and the extent of forecaster disagreement (i.e., dispersion) over future 
inflation and government purchases. They document that the EPU index foreshadows declines in aggregate 
investment, hiring, and consumption. 
4 I adopt the definition of “access” relied upon by several studies in the political science literature. These 
studies emphasize that money buys access, direct contact with a member of Congress or members of his or 
her staff (Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001), ultimately securing a legislator’s attention (Austen-Smith 1995). 
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Campaign support not only increases the ability of firms to interact with 
legislators (i.e., provides access), but ultimately influences the quality of 
communication. For instance, connected firms enjoy “face time” with the legislator, 
rather than a member of their staff (Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001). Furthermore, 
contributing firms also have a greater understanding of the individual legislator’s policy 
preferences and to what extent those preferences are (mis)aligned with the constituency 
that they serve (Austen-Smith, 1995). While the legislative process can produce an 
abundance of information and possible alternatives, increased understanding over the 
factors that comprise the policymaker’s objective function allows connected firms to 
assess the likelihood of legislative outcomes with greater precision. Thus, contributing 
firms not only enjoy differential access to policy news, but also gain a better 
understanding of how policymakers will react to information, further reducing 
uncertainty from the firm’s perspective. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that pending or prospective legislation 
represents a significant source of uncertainty from the firm’s perspective. Further, firms 
have an opportunity to hedge against potential policy shocks by gaining and maintaining 
access to policymakers via continued investment in campaign support. This support 
provides access to relevant information over which policies will be adopted and the 
potential impact of those policies. I argue that differential access to legislators should 
reduce investment-related information risk from the firm’s perspective, and thus 
mitigate the effect of political uncertainty on investment levels. Based on these 
arguments, I predict that: 
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Hypothesis:  The negative effect of political uncertainty on investment is mitigated 
by a firm’s superior access to political information via connections to 
policymakers.  




MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND 
POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS 
In this section, I outline the measures I use to capture time-varying political 
uncertainty and the degree of the firm’s political connectedness to legislators. I draw 
from literature in economics and finance that has developed and tested measures for 
these constructs.  
 
 
MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY 
 
I consider several measures of time-varying political uncertainty. First, I 
investigate the impact of uncertainty arising from the electoral process. Following the 
approach in Julio and Yook (2012), I construct a dichotomous variable, 
POL_UNCERTAINElectoral, set equal to one in the year leading up to a national election, 
and zero otherwise. Consistent with a rich literature in economics that examines the 
macroeconomic implications of political business cycles, Julio and Yook (2012) 
contend that the year leading up to a national election represents a heightened period of 
political uncertainty. In addition, this proxy offers advantages over alternative measures 
of time-varying political uncertainty. Investigating the impact of political uncertainty on 
investment raises concerns of potential endogeneity between uncertainty and economic 
growth. Specifically, policymakers absent poor macroeconomic conditions are more 
likely to maintain the status quo (Pástor and Veronesi, 2012). Elections are exogenously 
determined, recurring events in the U.S., providing a natural experimental framework 
that helps isolate the impact of political uncertainty from confounding factors. 
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I employ two additional measures of political uncertainty. The first, 
POL_UNCERTAINEPU, is designed to capture more general sources of time-varying 
political uncertainty. The second, POL_UNCERTAINTax, emphasizes uncertainty 
stemming from tax-specific legislation. In constructing these measures, I rely on the 
Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index developed by Baker et al. (2013). The EPU 
index is a contextual analysis-based measure built from the frequency of newspaper 
references to economic policy uncertainty found in over 2,000 local and national U.S. 
newspapers.5 Newspaper references are summed and reported on a monthly basis for 
general and policy-specific indices. To construct my first EPU-based measure, 
POL_UNCERTAINEPU, I begin by averaging the index over each quarter. I then take the 
change in the average value of the index relative to the prior quarter. Specifically, 
POL_UNCERTAINEPU is the average value of the EPU Index from the beginning of 
quarter t to the end of quarter t, less the average value of the EPU Index from the 
beginning of quarter t-1 to the end of quarter t-1. My measure of the tax-specific 
component of the EPU index, POL_UNCERTAINTax, is constructed in a similar fashion, 
but includes only those articles that specifically reference tax policy uncertainty, where 
tax-specific articles are separately summed and reported by Baker et al. (2013). I expect 
that changes in the level of uncertainty provide a powerful setting in which to observe 
changes in managerial behavior. Although the EPU index is subject to many of the 
design criticisms that the election indicator variable escapes, the EPU-based measures 
                                                          
5 The authors validate the EPU index along several dimensions, including a human audit of newspaper 
articles flagged by the automated contextual analysis program. Furthermore, the authors compare the EPU 
index against the frequency of the word “uncertainty” contained in the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) Beige Book, and large stock-market jumps surrounding policy news, finding a good 
correspondence in both cases. 
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allow me to study more general sources of political uncertainty as captured by the 
composite index, and tax-specific uncertainty as captured by the tax-specific index.  
Figure 1 plots the EPU Index and TPU Index over my sample period. The TPU 
Index spikes around the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. An 
important component of this act was intended to spur investment. For example, the 
JGTRRA increased both the percentage rate at which items can be depreciated and the 
amount a taxpayer may choose to expense under Section 179 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, allowing them to deduct the full cost of the item from their income without 
having to depreciate the amount. There are also notable spikes later in the sample period 
when extensions of this act were considered, and eventually signed into law.  
 
 
MEASUREMENT OF A FIRM’S POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS 
I measure a firm’s political connectedness based on the approach in Cooper et al. 
(2010). The authors contend that the dollar amount contributed and disclosed to the 
Federal Elections Committee (FEC) likely represents only a small fraction of total 
campaign support. Recognizing that many forms of political connections are 
unobservable (e.g., fundraising and electioneering campaigns), the authors construct 
several proxies for a firm’s overall political connectedness focusing instead on the 
number of candidates supported, and various candidate attributes (e.g., states 
represented, committee assignments, seniority, etc.). The authors argue that the number 
of candidates supported, and the attributes of these candidates, better capture the 
underlying nature of the firm’s overall political connectedness. Furthermore, to the  
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extent observable activity is correlated with unobservable activity, these measures 
should serve as reasonable proxies for political connections.  
I consider four measures of a firm’s political connectedness. The first, 
CONNECTEDCandidate, is the number of candidates supported by the firm over a six-year 
window. Specifically, following Cooper et al. (2010), it is defined as: 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝐿𝑛(1 + ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑡,𝑡−5
𝐽
𝑝=1 )    (1a) 
where Candpt,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has contributed money to 
candidate p over the years t-5 to t.  
The second measure is a dichotomous version of CONNECTEDCandidate. 
Specifically, CONNECTEDIndicator is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has 
any political connections as defined by CONNECTEDCandidate, 0 otherwise. This 
dichotomous variable, while simple, does not consider the magnitude, or the specific 
attributes of affiliated candidates, but is useful for economic interpretation of my 
empirical results.  
My final two measures are modifications of CONNECTEDCandidate, taking into 
account relevant candidate attributes. The first, CONNECTEDHomeState, captures the 
degree to which there is overlap in the legislator’s home district and the firm’s 
headquarters. Specifically, CONNECTEDHomeState counts the number of candidates 
supported by a firm if the candidate holds office in the same state in which the firm is 
headquartered. CONNECTEDHomeState is defined as follows:  
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝐿𝑛(1 + ∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑡,𝑡−5
𝐽
𝑝=1  )  (1b) 
where HomeCandidatept,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if candidate j is running 
for office from the state in which firm i is headquartered and zero otherwise. My use of 
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this measure is consistent with a line of research in political science that argues greater 
differential access will be granted to contributing firms that share a common district 
with an affiliated candidate (Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001). This is largely driven by the 
ability of large employers to mobilize their employees, which often represent a 
substantial constituency for the affiliated candidate. Furthermore, Eggers and 
Hainmueller (2013) contend that connections with home state candidates result in even 
less information asymmetry between the firm and the affiliated candidate because of 
geographic proximity, common policy objectives, and ideological views. Not 
surprisingly, the evidence in Cooper et al. (2010) suggests that CONNECTEDHomeState 
more strongly captures the value associated with political connections, relative to other 
measures considered by the authors.  
My final measure, CONNECTEDTax, captures investments in political connections 
to tax-writing members of Congress. Consistent with Brown, Drake, and Wellman 
(2014), I modify CONNECTEDCandidate to consider only members of the Senate Finance 
committee and House Ways and Means committee. Specifically, CONNECTEDTax is 
defined as follows:  
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑎𝑥 =  𝐿𝑛(1 + ∑ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑡,𝑡−5
𝐽
𝑝=1  )  (1c) 
where TaxCandidatept,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if candidate j is a member 
of the Senate Finance, or House Ways and Means committee. Brown et al. (2014) 
document the performance outcomes of gaining and maintaining relationships with  
tax-writing members of Congress in the form of lower and more consistent effective tax 
rates through time. The authors also document the complementary nature of connections 
to tax candidates and tax-specific lobbying efforts, but do not directly test the potential 
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benefits of having differential access to political information on managerial decisions. 
Given the increase in uncertainty surrounding various tax incentives linked to 
investment, this measure likely captures access to an important source of political 
information about pending or prospective tax legislation. Following Cooper et al. 
(2010), I construct all measures of political connectedness using Federal Elections 
Committee’s (FEC) database of political contributions made by firm-sponsored Political 








































                                                          
6 Political contributions are tracked by the FEC, as required by the Federal Election Campaign Act, and any 
contribution of $200 or above is publicly available on the FEC website starting with the 1979-1980 election 
cycle (http://www.fec.gov). I obtain firm headquarters data from Compustat. 





RESEARCH DESIGN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
This section describes the construction of the sample used to test my hypothesis. 
My sample comprises the intersection of historical accounting information obtained 
from Compustat, daily stock return data obtained from CRSP, analyst forecast data 
obtained from I/B/E/S, macroeconomic data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), and political contributions data obtained from the FEC website. After 
merging Compustat, CRSP, IBES, and BEA, and conditioning on the data required for 
my analysis, the sample consists of 104,220 firm-quarter observations, with 5,289 
unique firms. The result of my sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 1, 
Panel A. 
I then combine this dataset with a comprehensive dataset of political 
contributions. I obtain PAC data from the FEC detailed committee and candidate 
summary contribution files. Linking data on firm-sponsored PACs to financial data from 
Compustat requires matching multiple records, sometimes manually, by company name. 
I rely on the link table constructed by Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, and Graffin (2014) 
for the period January 1, 1991 – December 31, 2011, which allows me to merge FEC 
data to the dataset containing firm-quarter observations. After merging with the FEC 
data, the final dataset consists of 1,673 politically active firms, with a total 847,896 of 
transactions (i.e. individual hard money political contributions). These contributions are 
made through firm-sponsored PACs to politicians running for President, the Senate, and 
the House of Representatives. From this file, I observe the date and the amount of each 
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contribution, the identity of the receiving candidate, and the home state/district of the 
candidate. In addition, I obtain data on Congressional committee assignments from the 
House and Senate websites, and identify all candidates serving on either the House 
Ways and Means Committee or Senate Finance Committee during my sample period 




THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY ON INVESTMENT 
 
Consistent with Julio and Yook (2012), I model investment as a function of 
opportunity and available resources. Specifically, I replicate the findings of Julio and 
Yook (2012) for my sample period and firms by estimating the following OLS 
regression:  
Iit = α + β1POL_UNCERTAINt+ β2Qt-1 + β3CFit + β4∆GDPt-1 + γt + εit (2a) 
where i indexes firms, and t indexes quarters. The dependent variable, investment (I), is 
defined as capital expenditures for quarter t, scaled by beginning-of-quarter book value 
of total assets. I employ a measure of Tobin’s Q as my proxy for investment 
opportunities. Specifically, Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value 
of assets at the beginning of each quarter t-1. Cash flow, CF, is defined as operating 
income before depreciation, minus interest expense, minus taxes, minus dividends, 
scaled by beginning of year total assets (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004). Finally, to 
capture the effects of general macroeconomic conditions on firm investment, I include 
the quarterly change in GDP, ∆GDP, measured as the percentage change in real GDP in 
the quarter prior to the investment decision. Firm, quarter, and year fixed effects are also 
included in the specification. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year throughout 
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the paper (Petersen, 2009). Consistent with Julio and Yook (2012), all continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles throughout the analysis.  
To the extent that macroeconomic conditions are correlated with the current 
political climate and a firm’s investment decisions, failure to adequately control for 
general macroeconomic conditions may confound my results. Following a line of 
research in economics (e.g., Drazen, 2001), I argue that prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions and the current political climate are distinct constructs but acknowledge that 
these constructs are likely correlated. Specifically, policymakers are motivated by 
economic (e.g., maximizing general welfare) and non-economic (e.g., (re)election 
efforts, partisan preferences, and the demands of competing constituents) objectives. 
The latter, which cannot be perfectly inferred by investors, is primarily what gives rise 
to uncertainty over policy changes. 
To address this concern, I include additional macroeconomic indicators in my 
multivariate analysis. Standard investment models imply that the decision to invest is 
made on the basis of the present value of expected cash flows stemming from the 
potential investment. Thus, the decision to invest is a function of projected cash flows 
and the discount rate. Prior literature has explored sources of time-series variation in the 
discount rate, including the term premium, default premium, and the risk-free rate of 
interest (Fama and French, 1989; Collins and Kothari, 1989). Since my hypothesis 
predicts that investment decisions are sensitive to the level of time-varying political 
uncertainty, I further isolate the effect of political uncertainty by controlling for 
previously documented components of the discount rate just described. Specifically, I 
augment the model in Julio and Yook (2012) to include proxies for the term spread, 
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TERM, and the default spread, DEF, and the risk-free rate, TBILL. Including these 
controls yields the following OLS regression: 
Iit = α + β1POL_UNCERTAINt+ β4Qt-1 + β5CFit + β6∆GDPt-1 + β7∆DEFt-1  
                + β8∆TERMt-1 + β9∆TBILLt-1 + γt + εit     (2b) 
The coefficient on POL_UNCERTAIN, β1, is designed to capture changes in the 
conditional investment rate in periods of high political uncertainty, controlling for firm 
investment-opportunities and economic conditions. Consistent with Julio and Yook 
(2012), I expect a negative association between investment and political uncertainty  
(i.e., β1<0). Table 2 provides multivariate evidence on the negative effect of political 
uncertainty on investment. In Panel A, I investigate the effect of electoral uncertainty. In 
columns (1) – (3) of Panel A, I document evidence consistent with Julio and Yook 
(2012). Specifically, in column (1), the coefficient on POL_UNCERTAINElectoral  
is -0.0018 (t = -3.31, two-tailed p < 0.01), which is consistent with lower levels of 
investment, on average, in the four quarters leading up to an election, relative to all 
other quarters. In columns (2) and (3) this effect continues to hold after including 
relevant firm characteristics and macroeconomic controls, where the coefficient on 
POL_UNCERTAINElectoral is -0.0017 (t = -3.24, two-tailed p < 0.01) and -0.0017  
(t = -3.22, two-tailed p < 0.01), respectively. In column (4), I augment the model relied 
upon by Julio and Yook (2012) to include additional determinants of time-varying 
components of the discount rate. I find that the main effect of POL_UNCERTAINElectoral 
remains negative and significant (coefficient =  -0.017, t = -3.15, two-tailed p < 0.01). 
In Panel B of Table 2 I investigate the general and tax-specific EPU index as 
constructed by Baker et al. (2013). While I document a negative and significant effect 
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for the tax-specific component of the EPU index (coefficient = -0.0015, t = -2.71,  
two-tailed p < 0.01), I do not find a significant negative impact on investment levels for 
POL_UNCERTAINEPU (coefficient =     -0.0006, t = -1.58, two-tailed p = 0.11). Taken 
together, the evidence in Table 2 is consistent with Julio and Yook (2012), where 
electoral uncertainty has a negative impact on investment decisions, even after 
considering additional macroeconomic controls. I also find evidence that tax policy 
uncertainty influences investment decisions, but do not find statistical significance for 
the broader measure designed to capture more general sources of uncertainty  
(i.e., POL_UNCERTAINEPU). 
 
TEST OF HYPOTHESIS: THE MITIGATING EFFECT OF POLITICAL 
CONNECTIONS 
 
In this section I outline the model used to test my hypothesis and the results of my 
analysis. I investigate to what extent firms are able to mitigate investment-related 
information risk introduced through uncertainty over policy outcomes by investing in 
differential access to policy news. I expect that firms that establish political connections 
with legislators via meaningful campaign support will enjoy differential access to policy 
news. Thus, I posit that the difference in investment levels over periods of increased 
uncertainty will be less negative for connected firms, relative to the difference in 
investment levels over periods of increasing uncertainty for non-connected firms. To 
test this hypothesis, I augment the baseline investment model to include measures of 
access to policymakers (i.e., CONNECTED). Specifically, I estimate the following OLS 
regression: 
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Iit = α + β1POL_UNCERTAINt+ β2CONNECTEDit  
           + β3(ELECTION YEAR x CONNECTED)it + β4Qt-1 + β5CFit + β6∆GDPt-1  
           + β7∆DEFt-1 + β8∆TERMt-1 + β9∆TBILLt-1 + β10SIZEit + β11HERFINDAHLit  
           + β12MARKET SHAREit + + β12(MARKET SHARE)2it  
       + β13N. PAC ACTIVEit + γt + εit      (2c) 
where i indexes firms, and t indexes quarters. The coefficient on the interaction of 
POL_UNCERTAIN and CONNECTED, β3, is designed to capture the difference in 
investment rates during periods of increasing uncertainty for politically connected firms, 
relative to the difference in investment rates during periods of increasing uncertainty for 
non-connected firms. Consistent with my hypothesis, I expect that connected firms will 
reduce investment levels to a lesser extent in response to periods of increasing political 
uncertainty, relative to the reduction in investment in response to period of increasing 
uncertainty for non-connected firms (i.e., β3>0).  
Consistent with Julio and Yook (2012), I model investment as a function of 
opportunity and available resources. To help rule out the possibility that CONNECTED 
is proxying for unobservable firm characteristics that are also correlated with investment 
decisions, I include in the regression model additional controls for the determinants of 
being politically connected. Politically active firms tend to be larger, and have more 
resources available for investing in the political marketplace (Cooper et al., 2010;  
Hillman et al., 2004). Thus, in addition to including a measure of cash flow to proxy for 
firm resources, I include additional proxies for firm size and market share, SIZE and 
MARKET SHARE, respectively.7 Furthermore, firms may have an incentive to 
                                                          
7 See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.  
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participate in the political process in order to compete against firms within and across 
industries for political favors, and/or collude with industry peers toward collective goals 
(Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). For example, collective action 
is more likely to occur in concentrated industries, where the benefits of political 
participation can be shared by many (Lux, Crook, and Woehr, 2011). Consistent with 
this, I include HERFINDAHL, to capture industry concentration. Furthermore, I include 
the number of firms within the focal firms industry that also invest in campaign 
financing, N. PAC ACTIVE, to capture industry trends in campaign financing activity.  
Table 3, Panel A, reports summary statistics for various firm characteristics of 
politically active and inactive firms. It is clear that politically active firms are 
significantly larger in terms of SIZE (CONNECTED mean = 8.5679,  
non-CONNECTED mean = 6.3943, t =183.29, two-tailed p < 0.01) and MARKET 
SHARE (CONNECTED mean = 0.0928, non-CONNECTED mean = 0.0231, t = 99.87,  
p < 0.01), and have more available resources in terms of cash flow  
(CONNECTED mean = 0.0235, non-CONNECTED mean = 0.0148, t = 29.94,  
two-tailed p < 0.01). While investment as a percentage of assets (i.e., INVESTMENT) is 
lower for connected firms, relative to non-connected firms  
(CONNECTED mean = 0.0020, non-CONNECTED mean = 0.0032, t = -4.65,  
two-tailed p < 0.01), the absolute dollar of investments for politically connected firms is 
significantly larger. Specifically, the value of investments for politically connected 
firms, on average, is $19.03 million, compared to $4.53 million for non-connected firms 
(t = -3.73, two-tailed p < 0.01, untabulated). This suggests that the investments made by 
connected firms represent a significant portion of total investments.  
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Table 3, Panel B, documents the difference in unconditional investment rates 
during periods of increasing uncertainty for politically connected firms, relative to the 
difference in unconditional investment rates during periods of increasing uncertainty for  
non-connected firms. I find that the difference in investment levels for CONNECTED 
firms between election quarters and non-election quarters is -0.0008. Likewise, the 
difference in investment rates for non-CONNECTED firms between election quarters 
and non-election quarters is -0.0018. The difference-in-difference is 0.001 (t = 2.83,  
two-tailed p < 0.01). This result provides some initial univariate evidence consistent 
with my hypothesis. Specifically, the difference in investment rates between election 
quarters and non-election quarters is less negative for CONNECTED firms, relative to 
the difference in investment levels from election quarters to non-election firms for  
non-CONNECTED firms.  
Table 4 provides multivariate evidence on the mitigating effect of political 
connections on the negative relation between investment levels and political uncertainty. 
In Panel A of Table 4, I investigate electoral uncertainty. In column (1), I find evidence 
consistent with my hypothesis, where the coefficient on the interaction of 
POL_UNCERTAINElectoral and CONNECTEDIndicator is 0.0009 (t = 2.91,  
two-tailed p < 0.01). In columns (2) and (3) this effect continues to hold after including 
relevant firm characteristics and macroeconomic controls, where the coefficient on the 
interaction of POL_UNCERTAINElectoral and CONNECTEDIndicator is 0.0009 (t = 2.95,  
two-tailed p < 0.01) and 0.0009 (t = 2.97, two-tailed p < 0.01), respectively.8  
                                                          
8 As an alternative to including firm fixed effects, I further study changes in CONNECTED through time. 
To do this, I identify firm-quarter observations where firms initiate (discontinue) political contributions 
during my sample period, and re-estimate my primary regressions separately for each of these subsamples. 
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In Panel B of Table 4, I move from the dichotomous variable to measures of the firm’s 
overall political connectedness that consider the breadth of connections, and relevant 
candidate attributes (Cooper et al., 2010). First, in column (1), I study 
CONNECTEDCandidate, which captures the total number of candidates that the firm i is 
connected to at the end of quarter t. I find that the coefficient on the interaction of 
POL_UNCERTAINElectoral and CONNECTEDCandidate is 0.0001 (t = 1.87,  
two-tailed p = 0.06 ). In columns (2) and (3), I factor in the extent of overlap between 
the legislators home state and the firm’s state of domicile with CONNECTEDHomeState, 
and investments in tax-writing members of Congress with CONNECTEDTax. Again, I 
find evidence consistent with my hypothesis, where the interaction on 
POL_UNCERTAINElectoral and CONNECTEDHomeState is 0.0002 (t = 1.99,  
two-tailed p = 0.04), and the interaction on POL_UNCERTAINElectoral and 
CONNECTEDTax is 0.0002 (t = 2.07, two- tailed p = 0.04). Regardless of the measure of 
CONNECTED used, I document evident consistent with my hypothesis.  
In Panels C and D of Table 4, I investigate the general and tax-specific EPU 
Index. Although the evidence is not as strong, I do find some evidence in support of my 
hypothesis. The interaction of POL_UNCERTAIN and CONNECTED is statistically 
positive across CONNECTEDHomeState (coefficient = 0.0004, t = 2.38,  
two-tailed p = 0.02) and CONNECTEDTax (coefficient = 0.0003, t = 1.71,  
two-tailed p = 0.09) when measuring political uncertainty with the general EPU index. 
                                                          
I find that the mitigating effect of political connections on depressed investment levels during periods of 
increased uncertainty is concentrated among firms who initiate, and maintain, political connections during 
my sample period. This suggests that firms who are able (unable) to capitalize on the benefits of political 
connections are those firms that initiate (discontinue) investments in relationships with policymakers.  
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Moving to the tax-specific EPU index, only interactions with CONNECTEDHomeState and 
CONNECTEDTax remain positive and significant. Specifically, the coefficient on the 
interaction of POL_UNCERTAINTax and CONNECTEDHomeState is 0.0006 (t = 1.97,  
two-tailed p = 0.05), and CONNECTEDTax is 0.0004 (t = 1.65, two-tailed p = 0.10), 
respectively. The evidence in Panel D suggests that only specific types of political 
connections are relevant for navigating tax-specific uncertainty.  
Intuitively, one might expect connections to tax-writing members of Congress to 
be more statistically powerful when investigating tax-specific sources of policy 
uncertainty. However, identifying important sources of information is only one piece of 
the puzzle. That is, while tax-writing members of Congress may have more political 
information pertaining to pending or prospective tax legislation, connected firms, on 
average, may achieve greater access to home state candidates (Hojnacki and Kimball, 
2001).  Differential access to home state candidates is largely driven by the ability of 
large employers to mobilize their employees (often a substantial constituency for the 
affiliated candidate), geographic proximity to the candidate, and common policy 
objectives (Eggers and Hainmueller, 2013). In fact, the statistical strength of 
CONNECTEDHomeState is consistent with the evidence in Cooper et al. (2010), who 
document that CONNECTEDHomeState more strongly captures the value associated with 
political connections, relative to other measures considered by the authors.  
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CHAPTER 5  
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
ADDRESSING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: PRE-ELECTORAL 
MANIPULATION HYPOTHESIS 
 
My primary hypothesis predicts that politically connected firms are able to 
mitigate the negative consequences of policy uncertainty on capital investments by 
achieving superior access to political information.  Overall, my findings support this 
hypothesis.  Specifically, I find that connected firms are able to mitigate some, but not 
all, of the negative effect of policy uncertainty on investment, decreasing their rate of 
investment to a lesser extent than non-connected firms during periods of increased 
uncertainty. An alternative theory to the one advanced in this study maintains that 
connected firms have an incentive to change their investment behavior in order to 
ensure (re)election for affiliated candidates (e.g., Nordhaus, 1975). This theory would 
suggest that connected firms artificially inflate investment rates in the period leading up 
to an election relative to non-connected firms. This implies that the incremental 
investment rates observed in connected firms in my sample are not due to their access to 
political information, which they use to reduce political uncertainty, but due to an 
incentive to support candidates.  
Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) consider to what extent connected firms 
attempt to shield affiliated candidates from voter scrutiny through accruals 
manipulation. Specifically, they examine accrual choices of outsourcing firms and find 
that politically connected firms who also engage in relatively more outsourcing are more 
likely to have income-decreasing discretionary accruals in the period just before an 
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election. Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) document evidence consistent with the 
pre-electoral manipulation hypothesis in the context of accruals manipulation. Since real 
decisions may be more costly for a manager to manipulate (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), 
it is unclear to what extent their evidence will extend to real investment decisions.  
While I document evidence consistent with my hypothesis relying on alternative 
measures of political uncertainty (i.e. POL_UNCERTAINEPU and POL_UNCERTAINTax) 
that are not subject to the same criticism, I further address this alternative explanation 
by examining investment reversals in the post-election period. If investment during 
periods of increased uncertainty are meant to influence voter sentiment in that period, 
but not meant to improve the economic performance of the firm, then I expect managers 
to artificially inflate investment in the pre-election period, thus observing relatively 
higher investment rates than non-connected firms between election quarters and non-
election quarters. Subsequently, if connected firms are artificially inflating investment, I 
expect that they will reduce these increases in investment once the election is over  
(i.e., during the post-election period).  
To test this alternative hypothesis, I construct a post-election indicator variable 
similar to the election quarter indicator variable. Specifically, the post-election indicator 
variable, POL_UNCERTAINPost-Electoral, takes a value of one in the four quarters after a 
presidential election. I then include this indicator variable in my investment 
specification. To test whether investments rates between politically connected and non-
connected firms vary between post-election quarter and other quarters, I further 
interaction POL_UNCERTAINPost-Electoral with all measures of political connectedness. 
Overall, I do not find evidence that connected firms decrease investment in the  
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post-election period. Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction of 
POL_UNCERTAINPost-Electoral and CONNECTEDIndicator is insignificant, where a negative 
and significant coefficient would imply investment reversals in the post-election period. 
The result is consistent across all measures of political connectedness. Overall the 
evidence in Table 5 provides additional support to my hypothesis, and is inconsistent 
with the alternative explanation of pre-electoral manipulation.  
 
ADDRESSING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: CONTROLLING FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHIN AN INDUSTRY 
 
In this section, I investigate the influence of collective campaign financing 
activity among firms within an industry. Given the findings of my main analysis, one 
possible concern is that I am not adequately controlling for collective action. In other 
words, the moderating effect of firm-specific political connectedness on macro-level 
political uncertainty may be a result of collective action at the industry-level.  
To address this concern, I investigate whether firm-specific effects are robust to 
including a control for aggregate PAC participation within a given industry. To address 
this concern, I aggregate CONNECTEDCandidate by industry group (using the 49 
industries identified in Fama and French 1997) to construct an industry-based measure, 
CONNECTEDIndustry. I then re-estimate the investment model, including 
CONNECTEDIndustry as an additional control variable.  
First, I provide descriptive evidence of the correlation among the various 
measures of political connectedness. In Table 6, I document that all firm-specific 
measures of political connectedness (i.e. CONNECTEDIndicator, CONNECTEDCandidate, 
CONNECTEDHome, CONNECTEDTax) are highly correlated.  Specifically, focusing on 
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Pearson correlations, the two most highly correlated proxies are CONNECTEDHome and 
CONNECTEDTax (coefficient = 0.896, p<0.01). The two least correlated proxies, 
although still highly correlated in general, are CONNECTEDCandidate and 
CONNECTEDHomeTax (coefficient = 0.714, p < 0.01).  In contrast, I document a 
significantly lower correlation between the proxy for collective action, 
CONNECTEDIndustry, and any of the firm-specific measures of political connectedness, 
where coefficients range from 0.225 to 0.111 (p < 0.01).  This may not be surprising 
given that firms compete both within and across industries in the market for political 
favors.  Thus, to the extent firm-specific policy objectives differ from collective goals, I 
would not expect firm-specific and industry-based measures to be positively correlated.    
 In Table 7, I document that my primary analysis is robust to including an 
additional control for aggregate PAC participation at the industry level. In Panel A, I 
document that, regardless of the measure of CONNECTED used, the coefficient on the 
interaction between POL_UNCERTAINElectoral and CONNECTED is positive and 
significant. In Panels B and C, I investigate more general and tax-specific sources of 
political uncertainty. After controlling for aggregate PAC participation within an 
industry, only CONNECTEDHome and CONNECTEDTax have a significant mitigating 
effect on POL_UNCERTAINEPU and POL_UNCERTAINTax. In general, the findings of 
my primary analysis are robust to including sources of industry-level PAC participation.  
 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS TO ADDRESS OMITTED VARIABLES 
 
Collectively, the evidence in Section 4 is consistent with firms obtaining value 
relevant information through their political connections. In this section I investigate 
alternative specifications designed to address the possibility that time-invariant firm 
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characteristics are driving the observed results. First, I hold the firm constant and 
examine the mitigating effect of political connections during times when the firm is 
connected versus times when it is not connected. Second, I employ a difference-in-
difference design. 
First, I compare times when the firm is connected to times when the same firm is 
not connected. Specifically, I identify firm-quarter observations where firms initiate 
(discontinue) political contributions during my sample period, and re-estimate my 
primary regressions separately for each of these subsamples. In Table 8, I find that the 
mitigating effect of political connections is concentrated among firms that initiate, and 
maintain, political connections during my sample period. Specifically, among the 
16,127 firm-quarter the interaction of POL_UNCERTAIN and CONNECTED is positive 
and significant (coefficient = 0.0020, t = 2.53, two-tailed p = 0.01). In contrast, among 
firms that discontinue investments in political connections during my sample period, the 
interaction of POL_UNCERTAIN and CONNECTED is insignificant. This suggests that 
firms who are able (unable) to capitalize on the benefits of political connections are 
those firms that initiate (discontinue) investments in relationships with policymakers. 
Second, in addition to including firm fixed effects in my model, I re-estimate my 
investment regressions using a difference-in-difference design. A difference-in-
difference design is ideal in my setting because I can identify (1) a time period where I 
expect a temporary shock to investment decisions stemming from political uncertainty, 
election cycles, and (2) two types of firms that I expect to be differentially impacted by 
this shock, politically connected versus non-connected firms.  
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In addition, to reduce the influence of differences in time-varying characteristics 
between connected and non-connected firms from confounding my results, I fully 
interact my time-period dummy, POL_UNCERTAINElectoral, with all firm characteristics 
previously included in my main analysis. I further interact POL_UNCERTAINElectoral 
with all macroeconomic controls previously included in my main analysis to allow for 
the possibility that macroeconomic conditions differentially impact connected and non-
connected firms. Consistent with my hypothesis, in Table 9, I find that the coefficient on 
the interaction of POL_UNCERTAINElectoral and CONNECTEDIndicator remains positive 
and significant (coefficient = 0.0009, t = 2.26, two-tailed p = 0.02). 
 
POLICY UNCERTAINTY, POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, AND FIRM VALUE 
 
The real effect of political uncertainty on investment levels suggests time-varying 
political uncertainty has implications for how investors value the firm. Specifically, my 
findings imply that firms are unable to (fully) capitalize on their economic growth 
opportunities during periods of increased political uncertainty (see also Julio and Yook, 
2012; Gulen and Ion; 2013). As a result, previous rates of economic growth stemming 
from investment opportunities will not persist (Stigler, 1963; Fama and Miller, 1977). 
Consequently, the choice to forgo (reduce) investment implies less persistent economic 
growth, lower growth in abnormal earnings, and thus lower earnings persistence 
(Stigler, 1963; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Fama and French, 2000; Kothari, 2001) 
Following this reasoning, I examine whether investors consider time-varying 
political uncertainty when capitalizing current earnings news. Specifically, I estimate 
the market reaction to unexpected earnings, conditional on the level of political 
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uncertainty. Since variation in the response of equity returns is increasing with the 
expected persistence of earnings (Fama and French, 2000; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; 
Easton and Zmijewski, 1989), I anticipate that investors will discount unexpected 
earnings during periods of increased uncertainty.  
I include controls for determinants of time-series variation in the earnings-return 
relation identified in prior literature (Fama, 1990; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Johnson, 
1999). These determinants include time-varying macroeconomic factors GDP, DEF, 
TERM, and TBILL (previously defined in my investment regressions). To allow the 
slope coefficients to vary with unexpected earnings, I further interact these controls with 
unexpected earnings.  
I also include controls for the effects of cross-sectional variation in firm 
characteristics on the earnings-return relation. Prior research documents that the 
earnings response coefficient is increasing in earnings persistence and earnings 
predictability, and decreasing with firm-specific risk (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Easton 
and Zmijewski, 1989). Thus, I control for the revision in expected future cash flows as a 
function of prior earnings persistence, PERSISTENCE, measured as the coefficient on a 
one-quarter lag of earnings estimated from a firm-specific AR1 model of earnings over 
the prior 16 quarters. In addition, I estimate the variance in firm i’s unexpected earnings 
(PREDICTABILITY), where the higher the error variance, the lower the predictive 
power of past earnings with respect to future earnings. Furthermore, I include a measure 
of firm-specific risk (BETA) as a proxy for cross-sectional variation in expected rates of 
return (Easton and Zmijewski, 1999). To allow the slope coefficients to vary with  
 
37   
 
unexpected earnings, I further interact these controls with unexpected earnings, yielding 
the following OLS regression: 
UR(-1,+1) = α + β1UEit + β2POL_UNCERTAINt + β3(UE x POL_UNCERTAIN)  
    + β10∆GDPt + β11(UE x ∆GDP) + β12∆DEFt-1 + β13(UE x ∆DEF)     
    + β14∆TERMt-1 + β15(UE x ∆TERM) + β16∆TBILLt-1 + β17(UE x ∆TBILL)  
    + β4PERSISTENCEit + β5(UE x PERSISTENCE) + β6PREDICTABILITYit  
    + β7(UE x PREDICTABILITY)it + β8BETAit + β9(UE x BETA) + γt + εit    (3a) 
where i indexes firms, and t indexes quarters. The dependent variable, UR, is firm i’s 
three-day cumulative abnormal return around earnings announcement date t, relative to 
the Fama-French-momentum four-factor benchmark return (Carhart, 1997). The 
explanatory variable of interest, POL_UNCERTAIN, is defined in Section 3. If political 
uncertainty contains information about the mean reversion in profitability, then I expect 
to find a negative coefficient on the interaction of unexpected earnings and political 
uncertainty (i.e., β3 < 0). I am interested in the extent to which time-varying policy 
uncertainty varies predictability through time with the earnings-return relation, thus I 
include controls for determinants of time-series variation in the earnings-return relation 
identified in prior literature. A stream of research in accounting and finance has 
considered how expected returns and earnings-response coefficients vary predictably 
with time-varying components of the discount rate (Fama, 1990; Collins and Kothari, 
1989), and changes in macroeconomic conditions (Johnson, 1999).  Following this line 
of research, I include several controls for time-varying macroeconomic factors (i.e., 
GDP, DEF, TERM, and TBILL) previously defined in my investment regressions. To 
allow the slope coefficients to vary with unexpected earnings, I further interact these 
38   
 
controls with unexpected earnings and investigate the incremental effect of policy 
uncertainty on the relation between unexpected earnings and earnings announcement 
returns.  
In Table 10 I examine the effect of political uncertainty on the earnings-return 
relation. I find that the earnings-response coefficient is lower during periods of 
increased uncertainty. Specifically, in column (1), I document a negative and significant 
interaction between UE and POL_UNCERTAINElectoral (coefficient = -0.0068, t = -2.12, 
two-tailed p = 0.03). In column (2), the coefficient on the interaction of UE and 
POL_UNCERTAINElectoral remains negative and significant after controlling for 
macroeconomic characteristics (coefficient = -0.0065, t = -2.01, two-tailed p = 0.04).  
After including additional controls for firm characteristics, in column (3) of Table 
7 I find that the coefficient on the interaction of UE and POL_UNCERTAINElectoral 
remains negative and significant (coefficient = -0.0063, t = -1.89, two-tailed p = 0.06). 
Turning to columns (4) and (5), I continue to find that the interaction of UE and 
POL_UNCERTAIN remains negative and significant using the more general and tax-
specific measures of uncertainty.  
I then test whether investors incorporate the information on the mitigating effect 
of political connections on political uncertainty when capitalizing current earnings 
news. To the extent investors recognize the value of the information advantage for 
politically connected firms, I expect that the effect of political uncertainty on the 
earning-return relation will vary between connected and non-connected firms. To test 
this prediction, I re-estimate equation (3a), but include an additional term to capture the 
degree of the firm’s political connectedness. In addition, I further control for the 
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determinants of political connectedness included in the investment regressions. 
Specifically, I estimate the following OLS regression: 
UR(-1,+1) = α + β1UEit + β2POL_UNCERTAINt + β3(UE x POL_UNCERTAIN) 
    + β4CONNECTEDit + β5(UE x CONNECTED)  
    + β6(POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED)  
    + β7(UE x POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED)  + β8PERSISTENCEit  
    + β9(UE x PERSISTENCE) + β10PREDICTABILITYit  
    + β11(UE x PREDICTABILITY) + β12BETAit + β13(UE x BETA) + β14∆GDPt  
    + β15(UE x ∆GDP) + β16∆DEFt-1 + β17(UE x ∆DEF) + β18∆TERMt-1 
     + β19(UE x ∆TERM) + β20∆TBILLt-1 + β21(UE x ∆TBILL) + β22SIZEit 
       + β23(UE x SIZE)+ β24HERFINDAHLit + β25(UE x HERFINDAHL)  
     + β26MARKET SHAREit+ β27(UE x MARKET SHARE) 
     +β28(MARKET SHARE)2it + β29(UE x (MRKET SHARE)2) 
     +β30N. PAC ACTIVEit + β31(UE x N. PAC ACTIVE)+ γt + εit        (3b) 
In Table 11, regardless of the specification used, I do not find evidence that investors 
incorporate the value relevant information in political connections. Specifically, I do not 
find evidence that the reduction in the earnings-response coefficient during periods of 
increased uncertainty is mitigated by the political connectedness of the firm. Investors’ 
inability to recognize the value of connections is consistent with the findings of Cooper 
et al. (2010) who document future abnormal returns associated with the firm’s overall 
political relationships. The implication of their study is that investors do not 
immediately impound the information in political connections for firm value.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I test whether politically connected firms reduce the information 
asymmetry stemming from the political process, thereby mitigating the negative 
consequences of political uncertainty on investment. Articles in the business press 
highlight that “ongoing questions about government fiscal direction” create significant 
investment risk for firms (CFO Journal, 2014, March 5). More recently, debates over 
“lucrative” tax extenders, such as the bonus depreciation deduction, point to uncertainty 
preventing real decisions such as investment and hiring (CFO Journal, 2014, July 9). I 
argue that differential access to legislators, and thus access to relevant information over 
which policies will be adopted and the potential impact of those policies, should reduce 
investment-related information risk from the firm’s perspective. I predict, and find, that 
the negative effect of political uncertainty on investment is reduced (in part) by a firm’s 
superior access to political news through connections to policymakers. This finding is 
robust to alternative explanations related to the pre-electoral manipulation hypothesis 
and industry-level political participation. Collectively, the evidence in this study is 
consistent with politically connected firms obtaining access to relevant information 
about pending or prospective legislation, aiding managers in their investment decisions 
during periods of increased political uncertainty.  
I also consider the implications of the political uncertainty-investment link for 
firm value. There is little evidence that suggests that incorporation of macroeconomic 
factors helps to generate superior forecasts of firm earnings and value (Richardson, 
Tuna, and Wysocki, 2010). Richardson et al. (2010) suggest that a simple framework 
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that considers well motivated links between specific macroeconomic factors and 
specific firm-level outcomes would greatly enhance our understanding of how, and to 
what extent, macroeconomic factors should be incorporated into the forecasting task. In 
an effort to improve our understanding of the issues identified by Richardson et al. 
(2010), I estimate the market reaction to unexpected earnings, conditional on the level 
of political uncertainty. Depressed investment levels during periods of increased 
uncertainty imply lower growth in abnormal earnings, and thus less persistent earnings 
through time (Stigler, 1963; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Fama and French, 2000; 
Kothari, 2001). Drawing from this theory and evidence, I examine whether investors 
consider time-varying political uncertainty and the mitigating effect of political 
connections when capitalizing current earnings news. If investors do not expect current 
abnormal earnings to persist in the future, I predict that they will discount unexpected 
earnings in the current period. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the earnings-
response coefficient is lower during periods of increased uncertainty. However, I do not 
find evidence that investors incorporate the value relevant information in political 
connections as a mitigating factor.  
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Variable Name Variable Description 
Variables of Interest  
POL_UNCERTAINElectoral A dichotomous variable, POL_UNCERTAINElectoral set 
equal to one in the year leading up to a national election, 
and zero otherwise.  
  
POL_UNCERTAINEPU 
The average value of the EPU Index from the beginning of 
quarter t to the end of quarter t, less the average value of 
the EPU Index from the beginning of quarter t-1 to the end 
of quarter t-1 (See Baker et al. 2013).  
  
POL_UNCERTANTax 
The average value of the tax-specific EPU Index from the 
beginning of quarter t to the end of quarter t, less the 
average value of the EPU Index from the beginning of 
quarter t-1 to the end of quarter t-1(See Baker et al. 2013).  
  
CONNECTED The natural logarithm of the sum of supported candidates 
over rolling six-year windows, measured at the end of 
quarter t. 
  
CONNECTEDHome The natural logarithm of the sum of supported canddiates 
over rolling six-year windows if the candidate holds office 
in the same state in which the firm is headquartered, 
measured at the end of quarter t. 
  
CONNECTEDIncumbent The natural logarithm of the sum of supported canddiates 
over rolling six-year windows if the candidate serves on 
either the House Ways & Means Committee, or the Senate 
Finance Committee measured at the end of quarter t. 
Control Variables (in order of appearance) 
Q Tobin's Q measured asthe ratio of the market value of 
assets to the book value of assets at the beginning of each 
quarter t-1 
  
CF Cash Flow constructed as ((Operating income before 
depreciation  - interest expense - taxes - dividends)/total 




The quarterly change in real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) observed at the end of quarter t-1.  
  
∆DEF 
The quarterly change in the default premium obesrved at 
the end of quarter t-1. Default premium, following Fama 
and French 1993, is the difference between monthly U.S. 
corporate bond index return and the monthly long-term 
government bond index return. 




The quarterly change in the term premium observed at the 
end of quarter t-1. The term premium, following Fama and 
French 1993, is the difference between monthly long-term 




The quarterly change in the one-month T-bill rate observed 
at the end of quarter t-1.  
  
SIZE Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 
at the end of quarter t. 
  
MARKET SHARE Firm sales scaled by total industry sales measured at the 




The Herfindahl index of industry concentration computed 
with firm sales figures from Compustat, measured at the 
end of quarter t. 
  
NO. PAC ACTIVE 
FIRMS 
The number of firms in a firm's industry with PAC 
contributions, measured at the end of quarter t. 
  
PERSISTENCE 
Persistence of earnings, measured as the coefficient on one 
quarter lagged earnings froma  firm-specifc AR1 model for 
earnings estimated over the prior 16 quarters.  
  
PREDICTABILITY 
Predictability of earnings, measured as the adjusted R2 
from a firm-specific AR1 model for earnings estimated 
over the prior 16 quarters.  
  
BETA 
Firm-specific risk, BETA, measured as the slope coefficient 
from a regression of firm i’s dividend adjusted return on 
the equal-weighted market index over the 100-day period 

























I rely on the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index developed by Baker et al. (2013). The EPU Index is a contextual 
analysis-based measure built from the frequency of newspaper references to economic policy uncertainty found in over 2,000 
local and national U.S. newspapers. Newspaper references are summed and reported on a monthly basis for general and policy-
specific indices. The “EPU Index” captures newspaper references to “Economic Policy Uncertainty”. The “TPU Index” captures 








All firm-quarter observations included in Compustat, 1991-2011 894,863
Less: missing historical accounting data 526,467
Less: missing returns data 208,000
Less: missing analyst forecast data 123,510
Less: less observations with fiscal quarter end (does not coincide with GDP data) 104,220
Variable
a,b
N Mean Median Std. Dev.
INVESTMENT (I t /A t-1 ) 104,220 0.0029 0.0067 0.0370
Q 104,220 1.9763 1.5116 1.4295
CF 104,220 0.0168 0.0216 0.0393
N Mean Median Std. Dev.
Election Years 75,014 0.0026 0.0066 0.0374




 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses). 
Panel C: Mean Investment Rates in Election Quarters vs. Non Election Quarters
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Sample Selection 









a,b Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4)
POL_UNCERTAIN
Electoral
(-) -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017***
(-3.31) (-3.24) (-3.22) (-3.15)
Q 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(4.43) (4.82) (4.68)










Intercept -0.0385*** -0.0396*** -0.0396*** -0.0367***
(-46.89) (-47.09) (-47.05) (-21.45)
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.50% 49.50% 49.50% 49.50%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered 
by firm and year (Petersen 2009).
INVESTMENT it = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 Q it-1  + β 3 CF it  + β 4 ∆GDP it-1  + β 5 ∆DEF it-1  + β 6 ∆TERM it-1  + β 7 ∆T-Bill it-1  + ε
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 2
Political Uncertainty and Investment



























Firm Fixed Effects Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.50% 49.50%
N 104,220 104,220
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard 
errors that are clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009).
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 2, (Continued)
Political Uncertainty and Investment
INVESTMENT it = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 Q it-1  + β 3 CF it  + β 4 ∆GDP t-1  + β 5 ∆DEF t-1 

















N = 23,474 N = 80,746 Diff (1) - (2) t-stat
INVESTMENT (I t /A t-1 ) 0.0020 0.0032 -0.0013 -4.65
Q 1.7416 2.0445 -0.3029 -28.69
CF 0.0235 0.0148 0.0087 29.94
SIZE 8.5679 6.3943 2.1736 183.29
MARKET SHARE 0.0928 0.0231 0.0697 99.87
HERFINDAHL 0.1652 0.1590 0.0062 6.66





=0 (EQ = 1) - (EQ = 0)
CONNECTED
Indicator
 = 1 0.0030 0.0038 -0.0008
CONNECTED
Indicator
 = 0 0.0015 0.0033 -0.0018




 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel B: Mean Investment Rates by Election Quarters, and by Political Connectedness
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses). 
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Politically Connected vs. Non-Connected Firms















(-) -0.0020*** -0.0019*** -0.0019***
(-3.59) (-3.44) (-3.41)
CONNECTED ? -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0005
(-1.87) (-1.81) (-1.47)
POL_UNCERTAIN x


















                     + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2
it + β 13 HERFINDAHL it +  β 14 N. PAC ACTIVE it + ε
Table 4
Political Uncertainty, Political Connections, and Investment
Panel A: Electoral Uncertainty
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1   















N. PAC ACTIVE 0.0001
(0.35)
Intercept -0.0385*** -0.0367*** -0.0361***
(-46.72) (-21.43) (-16.78)
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.50% 49.50% 49.60%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are 















(-) -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018***
(-3.25) (-3.27) (-3.26)
CONNECTED ? -0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0002
(-0.61) (-1.91) (-1.27)
POL_UNCERTAIN x
CONNECTED (+) 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0002**
(1.87) (1.99) (2.07)
Q 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(4.44) (4.44) (4.45)
CF 0.0231*** 0.0231*** 0.0231***
(5.06) (5.06) (5.06)
∆GDP 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(3.26) (3.26) (3.26)
∆DEF -0.0423*** -0.0423*** -0.0423***
(-6.08) (-6.08) (-6.08)
∆TERM 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0104***
(3.57) (3.57) (3.57)
∆T-BILL -0.6530** -0.6540** -0.6540**
(-2.05) (-2.05) (-2.05)
SIZE -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004*
(-1.78) (-1.68) (-1.73)
MARKET SHARE 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022
(0.69) (0.70) (0.70)
                     + β 5 CF it  + β 6 ∆GDP t-1  + β 7 ∆DEF t-1  + β 8 ∆TERM t-1  + β 9 ∆TBill t-1  +  β 10 SIZE it  + β 11 MARKET SHARE it   
Table 4, (Continued)
Political Uncertainty, Political Connections, and Investment
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1   
                     + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2
it + β 13 HERFINDAHL it +  β 14 N. PAC ACTIVE it + ε











HERFINDAHL 0.0071*** 0.0072*** 0.0071***
(6.14) (6.16) (6.16)
N. PAC ACTIVE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.30) (0.39) (0.33)
Intercept -0.0360*** -0.0361*** -0.0361***
(-16.69) (-16.79) (-16.74)
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.60% 49.60% 49.60%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are 

















(-) -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0008** -0.0007*
(-1.89) (-1.89) (-2.10) (-1.89)
CONNECTED ? -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003* -0.0002
(-0.80) (-0.30) (-1.72) (-1.04)
POL_UNCERTAIN x
CONNECTED (+) 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004** 0.0003*
(1.40) (1.61) (2.38) (1.71)
Intercept -0.0375*** -0.0376*** -0.0377*** -0.0376***
(-17.81) (-17.82) (-17.88) (-17.83)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.60% 49.60% 49.60% 49.60%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year 
(Petersen 2009).
Table 4, (Continued)
Political Uncertainty, Political Uncertainty, and Investment
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1 + β 5 CF it 
                                                           + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2
it + β 13 HERFINDAHL it +  β 14 N. PAC ACTIVE it + ε
Panel C: Economic Policy Uncertainty Index




















(-) -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0017***
(-2.80) (-2.87) (-3.07) (-2.95)
CONNECTED ? -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0002
(-0.80) (-0.32) (-1.72) (-1.05)
POL_UNCERTAIN x
CONNECTED (+) 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006** 0.0004*
(0.83) (1.13) (1.97) (1.65)
Intercept -0.0374*** -0.0374*** -0.0376*** -0.0375***
(-17.75) (-17.74) (-17.82) (-17.77)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.60% 49.60% 49.60% 49.60%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
Panel D: Tax-specific Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year 
(Petersen 2009).
Table 4, (Continued)
Political Uncertainty, Political Connections, and Investment: Alternative Measures of Political Uncertainty
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1 + β 5 CF it 
            + β 6 ∆GDP t-1  + β 7 ∆DEF t-1  + β 8 ∆TERM t-1  + β 9 ∆TBill t-1  +  β 10 SIZE it  +  β 11 MARKET SHARE it  
                                                           + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2

















(-) -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018***
(-3.44) (-3.30) (-3.31) (-3.29)
CONNECTED ? -0.0007* -0.0001 -0.0005** -0.0003
(-1.73) (-1.18) (-2.13) (-1.58)
POL_UNCERTAIN
Electoral 
x CONNECTED (+) 0.0011*** 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0003**
(3.17) (2.44) (2.27) (2.46)
POL_UNCERTAIN
Post-Electoral
(?) 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.05) (-0.01) (0.06) (0.05)
POL_UNCERTAIN
Post-Electoral 
x CONNECTED (?) 0.0004 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0002
(1.01) (1.91) (1.12) (1.46)
Table 5
Investment Reversals
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1 + β 5 CF it 
            + β 6 ∆GDP t-1  + β 7 ∆DEF t-1  + β 8 ∆TERM t-1  + β 9 ∆TBill t-1  +  β 10 SIZE it  +  β 11 MARKET SHARE it  
                                                               + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2






Intercept -0.0360*** -0.0359*** -0.0361*** -0.0360***
(-16.73) (-16.64) (-16.74) (-16.69)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.56% 49.56% 49.56% 49.56%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year 
(Petersen 2009).
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a





















Indicator 1.000 0.809 0.866 0.827 0.111
CONNECTED
Candidate 0.820 1.000 0.847 0.890 0.225
CONNECTED
Home 0.901 0.848 1.000 0.896 0.149
CONNECTED
Tax 0.891 0.869 0.922 1.000 0.149
CONNECTED
Industry 0.059 0.224 0.082 0.094 1.000
b 
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 6
Pearson and Spearman Correlations, Measures of CONNECTED
a
c 
All continuous variables are winsorized (reset) at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
a 


















(-) -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018***
(-3.41) (-3.25) (-3.27) (-3.25)
CONNECTED ? -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0002
(-1.42) (-0.40) (-1.83) (-1.11)
POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED (+) 0.0009*** 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0002**
(2.97) (1.86) (1.97) (2.04)
CONNECTED
Industry
-0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0003**
(-2.03) (-2.02) (-1.96) (-1.98)
Intercept -0.0362*** -0.0361*** -0.0363*** -0.0362***
(-16.83) (-16.74) (-16.83) (-16.79)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.56% 49.56% 49.56% 49.56%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009).
Table 7
Controlling for Sources of Collective Action
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1 + β 5 CF it 
                                                      + β 6 ∆GDP t-1  + β 7 ∆DEF t-1  + β 8 ∆TERM t-1  + β 9 ∆TBill t-1  +  β 10 SIZE it  +  β 11 MARKET SHARE it  
                                                      + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2
it + β 13 HERFINDAHL it +  β 14 N. PAC ACTIVE it +  β 15 CONNECTED
Industry
it + ε

















(-) -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0008** -0.0007*
(-1.90) (-1.90) (-2.10) (-1.90)
CONNECTED ? -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001
(-0.75) (-0.10) (-1.63) (-0.89)
POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED (+) 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004** 0.0003*
(1.42) (1.63) (2.36) (1.74)
Intercept -0.0377*** -0.0377*** -0.0378*** -0.0378***
(-17.86) (-17.87) (-17.93) (-17.88)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.56% 49.56% 49.56% 49.56%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year 
(Petersen 2009).
Table 7, (Continued)
Political Uncertainty, Political Connections, and Investment: Alternative Measures of Political Uncertainty
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1 + β 5 CF it 
            + β 6 ∆GDP t-1  + β 7 ∆DEF t-1  + β 8 ∆TERM t-1  + β 9 ∆TBill t-1  +  β 10 SIZE it  +  β 11 MARKET SHARE it  
                                                           + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2
it + β 13 HERFINDAHL it +  β 14 N. PAC ACTIVE it +  β 15 CONNECTED
Industry
it + ε

















POL_UNCERTAIN (-) -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0017***
(-2.81) (-2.88) (-3.07) (-2.96)
CONNECTED ? -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002
(-0.75) (-0.11) (-1.64) (-0.90)
POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED (+) 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006** 0.0004*
(0.86) (1.16) (1.96) (1.68)
Intercept -0.0376*** -0.0376*** -0.0377*** -0.0377***
(-17.80) (-17.79) (-17.86) (-17.81)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.56% 49.56% 49.56% 49.56%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year 
(Petersen 2009).
Table 7, (Continued)
Political Uncertainty, Political Connections, and Investment: Alternative Measures of Political Uncertainty
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1 + β 5 CF it 
            + β 6 ∆GDP t-1  + β 7 ∆DEF t-1  + β 8 ∆TERM t-1  + β 9 ∆TBill t-1  +  β 10 SIZE it  +  β 11 MARKET SHARE it  
                                                               + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2
it + β 13 HERFINDAHL it +  β 14 N. PAC ACTIVE it +  β 15 CONNECTED
Industry
it + ε























Firm Characteristics Included Included
Macroeconomic Characteristics Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included
Adj. R-squared 58.50% 44.49%
N 16,127 2,420
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are 
clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009).
                            + β5CFit + β 6 ∆GDP t-1  + β 7 ∆DEF t-1  + β 8 ∆TERM t-1  + β 9 ∆TBill t-1  +  β 10 SIZE it 
Table 8
Changes in Connected Over Time
INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED + β 4 Q it-1 
                            + β11MARKET SHAREit + β 12 (MARKET SHARE)
2
































POLI UNCERTAIN x Q -0.0001
(-0.92)
POLI UNCERTAIN x CF 0.0069
(1.36)
POLI UNCERTAIN x ∆GDP -0.0009***
(-9.03)
POLI UNCERTAIN x ∆DEF 0.3140***
(11.06)
POLI UNCERTAIN x ∆TERM 0.0604***
(5.21)












INVESTMENT it  = α + β 1 POL_UNCERTAIN t  + β 2 CONNECTED it  + β 3 POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED 









N. PAC ACTIVE 0.0001
(0.51)
POLI UNCERTAIN x SIZE -0.0001
(-0.00)
POLI UNCERTAIN x MARKET SHARE 0.0037
(1.01)




POLI UNCERTAIN x HERFINDAHL 0.0005
(0.33)




Firm Fixed Effects Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included
Year Fixed Effects Included




 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard 
errors that are clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009).
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.











a,b Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UE (+) 0.0375*** 0.0770*** 0.0788*** 0.0737*** 0.0760***
(23.71) (11.60) (11.20) (10.49) (10.81)
POL_UNCERTAIN (?) 0.0002 0.0007 0.0009* 0.0014** 0.0015
(0.40) (1.35) (1.66) (2.21) (1.33)
UE x POL_UNCERTAIN (-) -0.0068** -0.0065** -0.0063* -0.0183*** -0.0225***
(-2.12) (-2.01) (-1.89) (-5.64) (-4.25)
UE x ∆GDP 0.0012*** 0.0012*** -0.0005 -0.0001
(3.51) (3.27) (-1.38) (-0.01)
UE x ∆DEF -0.0399 -0.0357 0.0530 0.0200
(-0.56) (-0.49) (0.73) (0.28)
UE x ∆TERM 0.0726 0.0606 0.0254 0.0643
(1.60) (1.30) (0.54) (1.38)
UE x ∆T-BILL -9.2280*** -9.3070*** -8.2020*** -8.8780***
(-5.65) (-5.66) (-4.96) (-5.34)
UE x PERSISTENCE -0.0063* -0.0047 -0.0053
(-1.66) (-1.25) (-1.41)
UE x PREDICTABILITY -0.0018 -0.0040 -0.0039
(-0.20) (-0.44) (-0.44)
UE x BETA 0.0003 0.0010 0.0008
(0.13) (0.55) (0.43)
_____________________
UR (-1,+1)i = α + β 1 UE it + β 2 POL_UNCERTAIN t + β 3 (UE x POL_UNCERTAIN) + β 4 (UE x Macro Characteristics) 
Table 10
Political Uncertainty and the Earnigns-Return Relation







Intercept 0.0035*** 0.0072*** 0.0092*** 0.0103*** 0.0098***
(3.51) (2.70) (3.25) (3.61) (3.46)
Main Effects - Macro Charactertistics Not Included Included Included Included Included
Main Effects - Firm Characteristics Not Included Not Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 8.60% 8.80% 9.00% 9.10% 9.00%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by broker and 
firm (Petersen 2009).




















UE 0.1070*** 0.1140*** 0.1070*** 0.1110***
(11.44) (12.07) (11.41) (11.79)
POL_UNCERTAIN -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.22)
UE x POL_UNCERTAIN (-) 0.0042 0.0034 0.0051 0.0043
(1.18) (1.02) (1.43) (1.25)
CONNECTED -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0008**
(-1.64) (-1.41) (-0.12) (-1.96)
UE X CONNECTED 0.0088* -0.0061*** -0.0056*** -0.0059***
(1.91) (-5.71) (-5.22) (-5.40)
POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED 0.0007 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.94) (1.57) (1.25) (1.28)
UE x POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED (+) -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0006
(-0.15) (0.67) (-0.90) (-0.25)
Panel A: Electoral Uncertainty
Table 11
The Moderating Effect of Political Connections on Political Uncertatiny and the Earnings-Return Relation
UR (-1,+1)i = α + β 1 UE it + β 2 POL_UNCERTAIN t + β 3 (UE x POL_UNCERTAIN) it  + β 4 CONNECTED it  + β 5 (UE x CONNECTED) it 
                   + β6(POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED)it + β 7 (UE x POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED) it  + β 8 (UE x Macro Characteristics) it 







Inercept 0.0181*** 0.0183*** 0.0184*** 0.0180***
(4.67) (4.72) (4.74) (4.64)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Charactertistics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 9.10% 9.20% 9.10% 9.10%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009).


















UE 0.1020*** 0.1080*** 0.1030*** 0.1060***
(11.00) (11.52) (11.04) (11.30)
POL_UNCERTAIN 0.0014** 0.0013* 0.0015** 0.0013**
(2.07) (1.94) (2.29) (2.04)
UE x POL_UNCERTAIN (-) -0.0178*** -0.0172*** -0.0194*** -0.0180***
(-5.19) (-5.12) (-5.68) (-5.35)
CONNECTED -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0007*
(-1.47) (-1.12) (0.22) (-1.76)
UE X CONNECTED 0.0073** -0.0060*** -0.0055*** -0.0057***
(2.10) (-5.59) (-5.08) (-5.25)
POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001
(0.10) (0.92) (-0.78) (0.33)
UE x POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED (+) 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0055** 0.0020
(0.34) (-0.17) (1.97) (0.90)
Panel B: Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
Table 11, (Continued)
The Moderating Effect of Political Connections on Political Uncertatiny and the Earnings-Return Relation
UR (-1,+1)i = α + β 1 UE it + β 2 POL_UNCERTAIN t + β 3 (UE x POL_UNCERTAIN) it  + β 4 CONNECTED it  + β 5 (UE x CONNECTED) it 
                   + β9(UE x Firm Characteristics)it + β10Macro Characteristicst + β11Firm Characteristicsit + ε







Inercept 0.0182*** 0.0183*** 0.0186*** 0.0181***
(4.94) (4.95) (5.02) (4.90)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Charactertistics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 9.20% 9.20% 9.20% 9.20%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009).


















UE 0.1050*** 0.1110*** 0.1060*** 0.1090***
(11.27) (11.79) (11.27) (11.56)
POL_UNCERTAIN 0.0013 0.0010 0.0015 0.0012
(1.09) (0.91) (1.28) (1.01)
UE x POL_UNCERTAIN (-) -0.0219*** -0.0202*** -0.0247*** -0.0222***
(-3.82) (-3.64) (-4.33) (-3.97)
CONNECTED -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0007*
(-1.49) (-1.20) (0.16) (-1.84)
UE X CONNECTED 0.0079** -0.0060*** -0.0056*** -0.0058***
(2.27) (-5.65) (-5.15) (-5.33)
POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED 0.0011 0.0007* 0.0001 0.0007
(0.80) (1.95) (0.00) (1.28)
UE x POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED (+) 0.0025 -0.0014 0.0079 0.0022
(0.20) (-0.48) (1.64) (0.55)
                   + β9(UE x Firm Characteristics)it + β10Macro Characteristicst + β11Firm Characteristicsit + ε
Table 11, (Continued)
The Moderating Effect of Political Connections on Political Uncertatiny and the Earnings-Return Relation
UR (-1,+1)i = α + β 1 UE it + β 2 POL_UNCERTAIN t + β 3 (UE x POL_UNCERTAIN) it  + β 4 CONNECTED it  + β 5 (UE x CONNECTED) it 
                   + β6(POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED)it + β 7 (UE x POL_UNCERTAIN x CONNECTED) it  + β 8 (UE x Macro Characteristics) it 






Inercept 0.0179*** 0.0179*** 0.0182*** 0.0178***
(4.86) (4.86) (4.93) (4.80)
Firm Characteristics Included Included Included Included
Macroeconomic Charactertistics Included Included Included Included
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Quarter Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Cluster by Firm and by Year Included Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 9.10% 9.20% 9.20% 9.20%
N 104,220 104,220 104,220 104,220
a
 All variables are defined in Appendix A.
b
 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by broker and firm (Petersen 2009).
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
